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Fix the 'infinite recursion detected in policy for relation' error in Lovable

The Postgres error 'infinite recursion detected in policy for relation' means one of your Supabase Row Level Security policies queries the same table it protects. Checking the policy forces Postgres to re-check the policy, forever. The reliable fix is a SECURITY DEFINER helper function that reads the table without re-triggering RLS — or a flatter, non-recursive policy. Here is exactly how to do both.

By Founder Name · Last verified: 2026-06-25

What does 'infinite recursion detected in policy for relation' actually mean?

It is Postgres error code 42P17. It fires when a Row Level Security policy on a table contains a subquery that reads the same table the policy is protecting. To decide if a row is visible, Postgres must run the policy. But the policy itself does a SELECT on that table, which triggers the policy again, which does the SELECT again. Postgres detects the loop and aborts instead of hanging.

In a Lovable app this almost always shows up after the AI generates a multi-tenant or role-based access pattern. A classic trigger: a policy on a 'profiles' or 'team_members' table that says 'you can read this row if you are an admin' — and it checks whether you are an admin by selecting from that very same table. That self-reference is the recursion.

The error is not random and it is not a Lovable bug. It is a correct, deterministic safety check from Postgres. The same SQL would fail on any Supabase project. That is good news: the fix is structural and permanent, not a credit-burning guessing game.

RLS Recursion Diagnostic — reading the 42P17 error
What you seeWhat it meansFirst move
infinite recursion detected in policy for relation "profiles"A policy on profiles selects from profilesFind the policy on profiles that subqueries profiles
Every query to one table returns the error, others workThe recursion is isolated to that one table's policiesAudit only that table's policies
Error appeared right after a 'roles'/'admin' promptAI added a role-check policy that self-referencesMove the role lookup into a SECURITY DEFINER function
Worked in preview, fails for real usersAnon/auth role hits the policy; the owner bypassed itTest as an authenticated non-owner user
Two tables reference each other's policiesIndirect (mutual) recursion across tablesBreak the cycle with a helper function on one side

Why did Lovable generate a policy that causes this?

Lovable's AI writes RLS policies from natural-language intent like 'only admins can edit team settings.' To express 'is this user an admin,' it often inlines a subquery against the same table — the simplest-looking SQL that matches the prompt. It reads cleanly but is recursive. The AI optimizes for the immediate prompt, not for how Postgres evaluates policies against themselves.

This is a textbook case of context rot at file 6-7: by the time the AI is layering role logic onto an existing schema, it has lost sight of the policies it wrote earlier. It generates a fresh self-referencing check rather than reusing a safe lookup pattern. A second related failure mode is false-fixed hallucination — you report the recursion, the AI replies 'Fixed the policy,' and it simply rewrites the same recursive shape with different column names. The error returns on the next real query.

If you have clicked Fix three or more times on this exact error and it keeps coming back, stop. You are in the Bug Doom Loop. Each attempt spends a credit and regenerates a policy with the same flawed structure. The recursion will not resolve until the role lookup is moved out of the policy body.

What NOT to do: do not keep clicking Fix or re-prompting 'fix the recursion.' The AI tends to regenerate the same self-referencing policy. Each click burns a credit and leaves the root cause untouched. The fix is a SECURITY DEFINER function or a flatter policy — both are SQL you apply once.

What is the recursive policy actually doing? (with the failing SQL)

Here is the canonical pattern that produces this error. A 'profiles' table holds a role column, and the SELECT policy tries to grant admins access by checking the profiles table from inside the profiles policy. Postgres must evaluate the policy to run the subquery, and must run the subquery to evaluate the policy — the loop Postgres aborts on.

The broken policy looks like this:

create policy "Admins can view all profiles" on public.profiles for select using ( exists ( select 1 from public.profiles p where p.id = auth.uid() and p.role = 'admin' ) );

The using() expression selects from public.profiles — the same table the policy guards. The moment any role (anon or authenticated) queries profiles, Postgres tries to apply this policy, which requires reading profiles, which requires applying this policy. It detects the cycle and raises 42P17 instead of looping forever.

The same trap appears with a 'team_members' table where membership is checked against team_members, or two tables whose policies each query the other (mutual recursion). The shape is identical: the policy needs data from a table whose access is gated by that same policy.

How do I fix it with a SECURITY DEFINER function? (the reliable fix)

Move the role or membership lookup into a SECURITY DEFINER function. Such a function runs with the privileges of its owner and bypasses RLS on the tables it reads, so the lookup no longer re-triggers the policy. The policy then calls the function instead of selecting from the protected table directly. This is the standard, Supabase-recommended way to break RLS recursion.

The helper function and the rewritten policy:

-- 1. Helper runs as owner, so it does NOT re-trigger RLS on profiles create or replace function public.current_user_role() returns text language sql stable security definer set search_path = public as $$ select role from public.profiles where id = auth.uid() $$; -- 2. Recreate the policy to call the function, not subquery the table drop policy if exists "Admins can view all profiles" on public.profiles; create policy "Admins can view all profiles" on public.profiles for select using ( public.current_user_role() = 'admin' );

Because current_user_role() is SECURITY DEFINER, its internal select from profiles does not invoke the profiles policy — the recursion is broken. Mark it stable so Postgres can cache the result within a statement, and always pin search_path to prevent a malicious schema from shadowing your table. For role checks specifically, the cleaner long-term pattern is a separate user_roles table so role data never lives in the same table its policy protects.

  1. Open the Supabase SQL Editor for your project (or the Lovable database/SQL panel).
  2. Create a SECURITY DEFINER function that returns the current user's role, reading the table directly.
  3. Lock the function down: set a fixed search_path and revoke broad execute grants as needed.
  4. Drop the recursive policy and recreate it so its using() clause calls the function instead of subquerying the table.
  5. Re-run the failing query as a normal authenticated user to confirm the error is gone and access is still correct.

Related: Lovable Supabase RLS permissions guide · RLS and auth best practices

Is there a fix that avoids a function entirely?

Yes, when the role data does not have to live in the protected table. The cleanest non-recursive design moves roles into their own table — for example user_roles(user_id, role) — and writes the profiles policy against user_roles instead of profiles. Because the policy now reads a different table, there is no self-reference and no recursion, with or without a helper function.

The restructured schema and policy:

-- Separate table holds roles, so the policy never reads its own table create table if not exists public.user_roles ( user_id uuid references auth.users(id) on delete cascade, role text not null, primary key (user_id, role) ); alter table public.user_roles enable row level security; -- profiles policy references user_roles, not profiles — no recursion create policy "Admins can view all profiles" on public.profiles for select using ( exists ( select 1 from public.user_roles ur where ur.user_id = auth.uid() and ur.role = 'admin' ) );

Give user_roles its own policies (typically: a user may read their own roles; only a service role or admin function may write them). This separation is the most robust fix because role escalation is harder, audits are simpler, and the recursion class of bug cannot reappear on that table. For many apps the SECURITY DEFINER function and a dedicated roles table are used together.

Either fix works. Use the SECURITY DEFINER function when you must keep roles in the existing table; use a dedicated user_roles table when you can restructure. Combining both — a roles table read through a SECURITY DEFINER helper — is the pattern we deploy on production audits.

How do I confirm the recursion is fully gone and access is still correct?

Reproducing the error from the owner account will not work — the project owner often bypasses RLS. You must verify as a normal authenticated user, and confirm that the fix did not silently open the table to everyone. Test both that the error is gone and that the access rules still hold for non-admins.

A fix that removes the error but exposes every row is worse than the recursion — that is exactly the misconfiguration that lets users see each other's data. Verifying as a non-owner user is the only way to catch it. If a non-admin can read rows they should not, the policy logic is wrong even though the recursion is gone.

  1. In the Supabase SQL Editor, run a SELECT against the previously failing table and confirm no 42P17 error is returned.
  2. Sign into your deployed app as a regular (non-admin) authenticated user and load the screen that was erroring.
  3. Confirm a non-admin sees only their own rows — not every row — proving the policy still restricts access.
  4. Sign in as an admin and confirm admin-level access still works as intended.
  5. Run a query as the anon role (logged out) and confirm it is denied or limited, not erroring and not wide open.
  6. Check the Supabase logs for any remaining policy errors after exercising each path.

Related: When Lovable users can see each other's data

When should I stop and bring in an engineer?

If the recursion returns after every Fix attempt, if two or more tables reference each other and you cannot find the cycle, or if removing the error risks exposing data, the access model needs a structural rewrite — not more prompting. A senior engineer can map every policy, install SECURITY DEFINER helpers, separate roles cleanly, and verify access as real users, then hand you the SQL and an explanation.

Signs to escalate: the same 42P17 error reappears after three or more Fix attempts; the error spans multiple related tables (mutual recursion); or you are unsure whether your 'fix' has quietly made the table public. RLS is the boundary between your users' private data and the open internet — guessing at it is the riskiest place to keep iterating with AI prompts.

Because a broken or over-permissive RLS policy is a live data-exposure risk, we treat it as urgent. An emergency review maps your policies, applies the recursion fix, audits for the can-see-each-other's-data class of bug at the same time, and leaves you with working, documented SQL you fully own.

Related: Lovable security audit service · Book an urgent RLS review

Frequently asked questions

What does 'infinite recursion detected in policy for relation' mean in my Lovable app?
It is Postgres error 42P17. One of your Supabase RLS policies queries the same table it protects. To decide if a row is visible Postgres must run the policy, but the policy reads that same table, which runs the policy again. Postgres detects the loop and aborts. The fix is to move the lookup into a SECURITY DEFINER function or restructure so the policy reads a different table.
Is this error a bug in Lovable or Supabase?
Neither. It is a correct, deterministic safety check in Postgres. The same self-referencing policy would fail on any Supabase or Postgres project, regardless of how it was created. Lovable's AI just happens to generate the recursive pattern frequently when you ask for role-based or multi-tenant access. Because it is structural, the fix is permanent once applied — it is not something that needs re-fixing.
Why does clicking Fix keep regenerating the same recursion error?
The AI tends to rewrite the policy in the same self-referencing shape with different column names, then reports it as fixed. That is false-fixed hallucination, and each attempt spends a credit. The recursion cannot resolve while the role lookup lives inside the policy body. Apply a SECURITY DEFINER helper function or a separate roles table once, in SQL, and the error is gone for good.
What is a SECURITY DEFINER function and why does it fix RLS recursion?
A SECURITY DEFINER function runs with the privileges of the user who created it, so it bypasses Row Level Security on the tables it reads. When your policy calls such a function to look up a user's role instead of subquerying the protected table directly, the lookup no longer re-triggers the policy. That breaks the cycle Postgres was detecting. Always pin its search_path and keep it as narrow as possible.
Is it safe to use SECURITY DEFINER, or does it create a security hole?
It is safe when written carefully. Keep the function tiny and single-purpose, set a fixed search_path (set search_path = public) so a malicious schema cannot shadow your tables, mark it stable, and grant execute only to the roles that need it. The risk comes from sprawling SECURITY DEFINER functions that do more than a focused lookup, not from the mechanism itself.
Can I fix the recursion without writing a function?
Yes, if the role data does not have to live in the protected table. Move roles into a dedicated user_roles table and write the policy against that table instead. Since the policy now reads a different table, there is no self-reference and no recursion. Many production setups combine both: a separate roles table read through a SECURITY DEFINER helper for the cleanest, safest result.
Why does the error only show up for my real users and not when I test it?
The project owner often bypasses RLS, so policies are not evaluated for you in the editor. Your authenticated end users hit the policy fully, which is when the recursion fires. Always reproduce and verify as a normal non-admin authenticated user — and as the logged-out anon role — to see the real behaviour your users experience.
After I fix the recursion, how do I make sure I did not expose everyone's data?
Test as a non-admin authenticated user and confirm they see only their own rows, not every row. A fix that removes the error but returns all rows is the can-see-each-other's-data misconfiguration, which is worse than the recursion. Also test the anon role to confirm logged-out access is denied or limited. Verifying as a non-owner is the only reliable check.
Two of my tables reference each other and both error — what is happening?
That is mutual (indirect) recursion: table A's policy reads table B, and table B's policy reads table A. Postgres still detects the cycle and raises 42P17. You break it by moving the lookup on at least one side into a SECURITY DEFINER function, or by introducing a neutral roles/membership table that neither policy depends on circularly. This case is easy to misdiagnose alone.
Can you fix this for me and check the rest of my RLS at the same time?
Yes. Because a broken or over-permissive RLS policy is a live data-exposure risk, we treat it as urgent. An emergency review installs the recursion fix, audits every policy for the can-see-each-other's-data class of bug, separates roles cleanly, and verifies access as real users. You get working, documented SQL you fully own. Book a call and tell us which table is erroring.

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