Fix the 'infinite recursion detected in policy for relation' error in Lovable

What does 'infinite recursion detected in policy for relation' actually mean?

The message is Postgres refusing to evaluate a policy that depends on itself, raised as SQLSTATE 42P17 — the code Postgres lists under Class 42 as invalid_object_definition. It fires when a Row Level Security policy on a table contains a subquery that reads the same table the policy protects: to decide whether a row is visible Postgres must run the policy, the policy SELECTs that table, which runs the policy again. Postgres detects the cycle and aborts rather than hanging.

In a Lovable app this almost always shows up after the AI generates a multi-tenant or role-based access pattern. A classic trigger: a policy on a 'profiles' or 'team_members' table that says 'you can read this row if you are an admin' — and it checks whether you are an admin by selecting from that very same table. That self-reference is the recursion.

The error is not random and it is not a Lovable bug. It is a correct, deterministic safety check from Postgres. The same SQL would fail on any Supabase project. That is good news: the fix is structural and permanent, not a credit-burning guessing game.

Related: RLS infinite recursion (glossary)

Why did Lovable generate a policy that causes this?

Lovable's AI writes RLS policies from natural-language intent like 'only admins can edit team settings.' To express 'is this user an admin,' it often inlines a subquery against the same table — the simplest-looking SQL that matches the prompt. It reads cleanly but is recursive. The AI optimizes for the immediate prompt, not for how Postgres evaluates policies against themselves.

This is a textbook case of context rot — the AI losing track of earlier decisions after it has edited several files: by the time it is layering role logic onto an existing schema, it has lost sight of the policies it wrote earlier. It generates a fresh self-referencing check rather than reusing a safe lookup pattern. A second related failure mode is false-fixed hallucination — you report the recursion, the AI replies 'Fixed the policy,' and it simply rewrites the same recursive shape with different column names. The error returns on the next real query.

If you have clicked Fix three or more times on this exact error and it keeps coming back, stop. You are in the Bug Doom Loop. Each attempt spends a credit and regenerates a policy with the same flawed structure. The recursion will not resolve until the role lookup is moved out of the policy body.

What is the recursive policy actually doing? (with the failing SQL)

Here is the canonical pattern that produces this error. A 'profiles' table holds a role column, and the SELECT policy tries to grant admins access by checking the profiles table from inside the profiles policy. Postgres must evaluate the policy to run the subquery, and must run the subquery to evaluate the policy — the loop Postgres aborts on.

The broken policy looks like this:

create policy "Admins can view all profiles" on public.profiles for select using ( exists ( select 1 from public.profiles p where p.id = auth.uid() and p.role = 'admin' ) );

The using() expression selects from public.profiles — the same table the policy guards. The moment any role (anon or authenticated) queries profiles, Postgres tries to apply this policy, which requires reading profiles, which requires applying this policy. It detects the cycle and raises 42P17 instead of looping forever.

The same trap appears with a 'team_members' table where membership is checked against team_members, or two tables whose policies each query the other (mutual recursion). The shape is identical: the policy needs data from a table whose access is gated by that same policy.

How do I fix it with a SECURITY DEFINER function? (the reliable fix)

Move the role lookup into a SECURITY DEFINER function that lives outside your exposed schema. Such a function runs with the privileges of the role that created it, so it reads the protected table without invoking that table's policy — the exact cycle Postgres was rejecting. Supabase documents this as the way to scan a roles table without RLS penalties, with one hard constraint: never create one in a schema listed under Exposed schemas.

The helper function and the rewritten policy:

-- 0. Helpers live outside the exposed schema, never in public create schema if not exists private; -- 1. Helper runs as owner, so it does NOT re-trigger RLS on profiles create or replace function private.current_user_role() returns text language sql stable security definer set search_path = public as $$ select role from public.profiles where id = (select auth.uid()) $$; -- 2. Recreate the policy to call the function, not subquery the table drop policy if exists "Admins can view all profiles" on public.profiles; create policy "Admins can view all profiles" on public.profiles for select to authenticated using ( (select private.current_user_role()) = 'admin' );

Because current_user_role() is SECURITY DEFINER, its internal select from profiles does not invoke the profiles policy — the recursion is broken. Three details are doing real work here. The function sits in private, because Supabase states security-definer functions should never be created in a schema inside your Exposed schemas — leave it in public and it is callable straight through the API, which is the same family of mistake as the apps where RLS is on and the table still reads publicly: enabled is not the same as enforced. It is marked stable and pinned to a fixed search_path so a malicious schema cannot shadow your table. And the policy adds to authenticated, which stops the expression running at all for logged-out requests.

Wrapping the call in select is not cosmetic. Supabase's published RLS benchmarks show that wrapping a security-definer role check this way lets the Postgres optimizer run it as an initPlan and cache the result per statement rather than per row: their has_role() test drops from 178,000 ms to 12 ms, and the is_admin() table-join test from 11,000 ms to 7 ms. An unwrapped helper fixes the recursion and quietly hands you a table scan instead.

1. Open the Supabase SQL Editor for your project (or the Lovable database/SQL panel).
2. Create a private schema for helper functions if you do not have one, so the function is never reachable through the API.
3. Create the SECURITY DEFINER function there, returning the current user's role, with a fixed search_path.
4. Drop the recursive policy and recreate it so its using() clause calls the function — wrapped in select — instead of subquerying the table.
5. Re-run the failing query as a normal authenticated user to confirm 42P17 is gone and access is still correct.

Related: Lovable Supabase RLS permissions guide · RLS and auth best practices

Is there a fix that avoids a function entirely?

Yes, when the role data does not have to live in the protected table. The cleanest non-recursive design moves roles into their own table — for example user_roles(user_id, role) — and writes the profiles policy against user_roles instead of profiles. Because the policy now reads a different table, there is no self-reference and no recursion, with or without a helper function.

The restructured schema and policy:

-- Separate table holds roles, so the policy never reads its own table create table if not exists public.user_roles ( user_id uuid references auth.users(id) on delete cascade, role text not null, primary key (user_id, role) ); alter table public.user_roles enable row level security; -- profiles policy references user_roles, not profiles — no recursion create policy "Admins can view all profiles" on public.profiles for select using ( exists ( select 1 from public.user_roles ur where ur.user_id = auth.uid() and ur.role = 'admin' ) );

Give user_roles its own policies (typically: a user may read their own roles; only a service role or admin function may write them). This separation is the most robust fix because role escalation is harder, audits are simpler, and the recursion class of bug cannot reappear on that table. For many apps the SECURITY DEFINER function and a dedicated roles table are used together.

How do I confirm the recursion is fully gone and access is still correct?

Verify as a non-owner or you have verified nothing. Policies are only evaluated for the anon and authenticated roles; Supabase's service key and any Postgres role holding the bypassrls privilege skip them entirely, which is why the SQL Editor and your own owner session can return clean results over a policy that is still broken for real users. Test that 42P17 is gone and that a non-admin still cannot read rows they should not.

A fix that removes the error but exposes every row is worse than the recursion — that is exactly the misconfiguration that lets users see each other's data. Verifying as a non-owner user is the only way to catch it. If a non-admin can read rows they should not, the policy logic is wrong even though the recursion is gone. And if sign-in itself is still broken once the policy is right, stop editing SQL — a login that fails after the policy change is almost always the Supabase Site URL and redirect allow-list, the Google OAuth callback, or an unconfirmed signup email, none of which a policy rewrite touches.

1. In the Supabase SQL Editor, run a SELECT against the previously failing table and confirm no 42P17 error is returned.
2. Sign into your deployed app as a regular (non-admin) authenticated user and load the screen that was erroring.
3. Confirm a non-admin sees only their own rows — not every row — proving the policy still restricts access.
4. Sign in as an admin and confirm admin-level access still works as intended.
5. Run a query as the anon role (logged out) and confirm it is denied or limited, not erroring and not wide open.
6. Check the Supabase logs for any remaining policy errors after exercising each path.

Related: Lovable login not working after an auth change · When Lovable users can see each other's data

When should I stop and bring in an engineer?

If the recursion returns after every Fix attempt, if two or more tables reference each other and you cannot find the cycle, or if removing the error risks exposing data, the access model needs a structural rewrite — not more prompting. A senior engineer can map every policy, install SECURITY DEFINER helpers, separate roles cleanly, and verify access as real users, then hand you the SQL and an explanation.

Signs to escalate: the same 42P17 error reappears after three or more Fix attempts; the error spans multiple related tables (mutual recursion); or you are unsure whether your 'fix' has quietly made the table public. RLS is the boundary between your users' private data and the open internet — guessing at it is the riskiest place to keep iterating with AI prompts.

Because a broken or over-permissive RLS policy is a live data-exposure risk, we treat it as urgent. An emergency review maps your policies, applies the recursion fix, audits for the can-see-each-other's-data class of bug at the same time, and leaves you with working, documented SQL you fully own.

Related: audit your Lovable app's security · Book an urgent RLS review